This paper analyzes the role of expenditures on property right protection within a standard quality ladder model of endogenous growth. We develop a model where quality of each good improves as a result of innovation. Once the innovator develops a higher quality good there is an exogenously given rate at which the good is targeted for imitation. We allow the innovator to undertake expenditure to protect the good from imitation and thereby reducing the effective probability of imitation. We show that the total intensity of property right protection is inversely related to the cost of property right protection and the effectiveness of the property right system. We also find a subsidy that reduces the per unit cost of property right protection has the same impact as an improvement in the efficiency of the property right system. In both cases the intensity of innovation goes up. We then consider the growth implications of the model and show that in the steady state the economy grows at a constant rate. However, during the transition to the steady state the rate of growth is positively related to the rate of innovation.
Introduction
Innovation and imitation both constitute technological progress. While innovation creates new products and production processes, imitation leads to the spread of the new technologies. It is also true that both innovation and imitation are uncertain processes. In either case there is uncertainty about the success of a particular R&D project. Innovative firms are also uncertain about how long they will be the sole producers of the state of the art product. They face the threat of other innovative firms who might discover a higher quality product and replace them at the top. This is the idea of creative destruction stressed by Joseph Schumpeter (1942) . Moreover, the new knowledge created as a result of innovation by its very nature is non rival and non-excludable. This creates a threat of imitation by other firms. To prevent imitation a system of property rights, usually in the form of patents (monopoly power) is granted to the innovator.
The new growth theory models pioneered by the work of Romer(1986 Romer( ,1990 have shown that intentional investment by economic agents in R&D leads to technological progress and consequently drives economic growth. The underlying feature of these models is the idea that a system of property rights make the new knowledge a partially excludable good and therefore the innovators can appropriate the returns from their investment in R&D. This provides the innovators with the ex ante incentive to innovate. In the absence of a system of patents there will be no ex ante incentive to innovate and therefore no technological progress and growth. Empirical evidence also points to the fact that intellectual property rights play an important role in spurring innovations. Kanwar and Evenson (2003) using a cross country panel data show that stronger intellectual property rights leads to a faster rate of technological progress. In a more direct approach Favley, Foster and Greenaway (2006) shows using a threshold regression model that stronger intellectual property rights leads to a higher growth in high and low income countries, but does not significantly affect growth in the middle income countries.
While majority of the theoretical literature focuses on the link between innovation, imitation, and growth, little attention has been paid to the role that property rights play in these processes.
The literature circumvents the problem of property right protection by either assuming that there is an infinitely long patent or that imitation is costly therefore no imitation takes place. However, in practice patents are awarded for a finite period of time and usually an innovation is imitated upon before the actual duration of the patent. For instance, Mansfield, Schwatrz, and Wagner (1981) found that 60 percent of the patented innovations they studied were imitated within 4 years. Some of the papers that model costly imitative activities assume that property rights are given exogenously and the innovator remains passive not expending any resources to protect the patent over the innovation. This also misses the point, because, in reality patent holders undertake substantial expenditure to protect their patents from potential infringement. An article in Fortune magazine (May, 2008) noted that protecting intellectual assets was among the top legal challenges for business leaders. In the article -intellectual property lawyers note that 'applicants need to deploy more legal muscle to counter each rejection and get their patents through....And fight harder to keep them'.
Innovative firms undertake various forms of expenditure to protect their intellectual property rights from potential imitators. For instance litigation expenditure , adding newer features to their products which render them difficult to imitate and so forth. Lerner (1995) notes that the direct patent litigation costs for the year 1991 accounted for more than 25 per cent of R&D expenditure for that year. More recently Bessen and Meuer (2008) show that between 1985-2004 the attorney's fee alone for the patentee was on an average $1.04 million (in 1992 dollars) per case. They further show that the the total loss to the litigating parties (both the patentee and the infringer) is much greater than the cost of the lawyers. As Crampes and Langinier (2002) notes while patents are typically viewed in the economic literature as a perfect exogenously given protection against imitation, their efficiency depends on their idiosyncratic characteristics and on the effort of the patent owner in trial and settlement procedures.
Our goal in this paper is to incorporate this aspect of the intellectual property rights system by considering the expenditure undertaken by the innovators to protect their patents and analyze its effects on the incentives to innovate and impacts on technological progress, growth and welfare.
There is a growing strand of literature that discusses agents' incentive to expend resources toward protection of their property rights and its impact on efficiency. 1 Dinopolous and Syropolous (2007) has extended the discussion to the context of growth with innovation and rent protection.
Our paper adds to this literature. We analyze the role of the expenditure undertaken by innovative firms to protect their property rights from potential imitators on the innovation intensity and economic growth. We incorporate these expenditures in the standard quality ladder framework (Grossman and Helpman 1991) wherein, once a firm innovates and attains a leadership position in a specific industry, it starts expending resources to protect their monopoly power. As noted above, these resources may take the form of legal fee, expenditure undertaken to keep the blue print of a product secret and so forth.
Our paper is different from earlier work in this area in several ways. Most of the earlier work concentrates on incentives to innovate and imitate and intellectual property rights are either non existent or exogenously given. Dinopolous and Syropolous (2007) incorporates Rent Protecting Activities in this framework, however, there is no threat of imitation. In their model, Innovators protect their innovations from other potential innovators and therefore innovation becomes progressively more difficult over time. Our paper considers the threat of imitation and innovators expend resources to protect their property rights. Successful imitation shifts the good from a monopoly market to a perfectly competitive market. So at each instant there are goods that are produced and sold in monopolistic and competitive markets. We derive the steady state rate of innovative intensity and the intensity of property right protection. We show that the intensity of property right protection depends on the relative cost of innovation to property right protection, the difficulty of R&D and the effectiveness of the property right system. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature review;
In section 3 we set up the model and solve for the steady state equilibrium. In section 4 we present some comparative static results and show the welfare properties of the model. 
Related Literature
The role of technological progress and the interaction between Innovation and Imitation in economic growth has been analyzed in several papers. Endogenous growth models treat technological change to be endogenous to explain growth amongst countries. In these models both innovation and imitation occur as a result of purposive expenditure undertaken by entrepreneurs in the Research & Development sectors, see for instance Romer (1991) , Grossman and Helpman 1991 (a,b) . Grossman and Helpman 1991a, develops a quality ladder model, in which repeated product improvement takes place in a continuum of sectors. The equilibrium distribution of qualities evolve overtime, but the rate of aggregate growth is constant. They extend this model in 1991b, in which they introduce imitation into the model. They study a two country model, where firms in the North innovate and firms in the South learn to imitate the products developed in the North. They assume that firms in the South are inept at innovation, while they have a comparative advantage in manufacturing the good, once they learn to imitate. The equilibrium rate of innovation and imitation is constant in the steady state and they show that subsidies to innovation in the North prevents imitation by the south under certain cases; while an imitation subsidy in South hinders innovation in the North.
In both the papers R&D decisions are made by forward looking, profit maximizing entrepreneurs. Segerstorm (1991) , on the other hand analyzes the issue of goods in the North being copied in the North itself. The paper develops a Dynamic General Equilibrium (DGE) model of growth with quality ladders in which both innovation and imitation occurs in th North. Innovation and imitation are stochastic processes, with the probability of success is increasing in the resources devoted toward them. They also assume that the R&D technology is linear. The paper determines a a steady equilibrium in which some firms devote resources to innovation and other firms devote resources toward imitation. The possibility of collusion between the innovators and the imitators gives the imitators an ex-ante incentive to imitate. The paper goes on to analyze the impact of subsidies to innovation, and shows that such a subsidy decreases the rate of innovation and increases the rate of imitation. Further, it leads to a higher growth rate in the economy and only increases welfare if innovative intensity is above a critical level.
Much of the work following Segerstorm, has been devoted to explaining the seemingly counterintuitive result that an increase in innovative R&D subsidy leads to an increase in imitative R&D and a decrease in innovative R&D. Cheng and Tao (1999) show that this result is caused by the assumption of a linear R&D technology. They show that by replacing this linear technology with a sufficiently convex R&D technology, the counterintuitive results are reversed. They assume that the R&D technology is linear at the firm level, but convex at the industry wide level. Davidson and Segerstorm (1998) , assume that R&D is subject to diminishing returns at the firm level as well. They introduce specialized labor in both innovation and imitation, where there are constant returns in both the generalized and specialized labor but diminishing returns to both of them individually. They show that in such a case an innovative (imitative) subsidy leads to higher innovation (imitation) and a lower imitation (innovation).
In all of the papers mentioned above little or no importance has been given to the role of property rights. Helpman (1993) addresses this issue in a two country DGE framework in which North innovates goods and south imitates. The paper shows that stronger intellectual property rights hurts the South. Kwan and Lai (2003) works out the optimal level of intellectual property right protection, by looking at the trade off between the loss in current consumption and gain consumption growth as a result of stronger property right protection. They calibrate the model to US data and conclude that under protection of property rights is more likely than over-protection.
Further, the welfare losses in case of under-protection is substantiallly greater than in the case of over-protection. These papers however ignore the expenditure undertaken by the imitators to infringe on the intellectual property rights of the innovator and the resources devoted by the innovator to protect the intellectual property rights. In a sense, they take the property rights to be exogenous.
A recent strand of literature on fully endogenous growth models have incorporated the rent pro-tection or property right protection aspects into their models. Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007) build a quality ladder model where incumbent firms devote resources to safeguard rent monopoly rents from their past innovations. They term these expenses as Rent Protecting Activities (RPA's).
In this model discovery of higher quality products is a result of sequential stochastic innovation contest between the incumbent industry leaders and followers. RPA's by the incumbents make innovation progressively more difficult. They show that in this case, long run growth depends positively on proportional innovative R&D subsidies and negatively on the effectiveness of rent protecting activities. Sener (2008) , develops a quality ladder model without scale effects in which incumbent innovators undertake RPA's against potential innovators and additionally innovation gets more difficult as goods move up in the quality ladder. Sener concludes that in such a scenario, it is optimal to tax R&D when innovations are of a very small and very large magnitudes. It is however optimal to subsidize them when innovations are of medium size. Both of these papers however do not take into account imitation and the contest between innovators and imitators. Our present work is closely related to Segerstorm (2007) , where there is both innovation and imitation.
Innovation gets progressively more difficult and is carried out by both incumbents and followers.
Imitation leads to elimination of monopoly power. The paper however does not consider property right protection on the part of the incumbent monopolist. Our work in essence incorporates expenditure toward property right protection from potential imitators, when innovation becomes difficult over time.
Model
We follow the basic quality ladders framework of Grossman and Helpman (1991a) adapted by Segerstorm (2007).
Industry Structure
There is an economy with a continuum of industries indexed ω ∈ [0, 1]. The products in each industry can be supplied in a countable number of qualities j=0,1,2,3... Firms are distinguished on the basis of the quality of product they produce. Quality improvement takes place as a result of uncertain and costly innovative R&D by firms. Every time a firm is successful in innovating, the quality of a good jumps from j to j+1. At any given point of time there are two types of industries.
Industry where there is a single quality leader as a result of successful innovation. Since we allow for imitation in the model, the second type of industries are those where successful imitation has taken place. In these industries there are multiple quality leaders.
Consumer Behavior
There are a fixed number of identical households that provide labor services for manufacturing, research and development and protection of property rights. The number of members of each household grows over time at an exogenous rate n> 0. The supply of labor at each point in time is therefore given by L(t) = L 0 e nt . Each household maximizes the inter-temporal utility function given by:
where ρ is the subjective discount rate, n is the population growth rate and u(t) is the consumer's instantaneous utility at time t. Instantaneous utility is given by
where d(j, ω, t) denotes the quantity consumed of a product of quality j produced by industry ω at time t, and λ > 1 represents the extent to which higher quality products improve on the lower quality products and κ ∈ (0, 1) determines the elasticity of substitution between consumer goods given by σ = 1/(1 − κ). The consumer maximizes the discounted utility subject to the inter temporal budget constraint
where R(t) is the cumulative interest factor up to time t, A(0) is the value of asset holdings at time t=0 plus the present value of future factor income, and E(t) is the consumer's per capita expenditure flow at time t. The consumer's time t expenditure flow is given by
where p(j, ω, t) is the price of a product of quality j produced by industry ω at time t. We normalize a worker's wage equal to one and analyze the steady state equilibrium where the consumers expenditure E becomes constant overtime.
Utility maximization involves two steps. First is a static problem where consumer chooses for a given expenditure E(t), and price vectors p(j, ω, t) the quantity of each good of quality j from industry ω. This involves maximizing the instantaneous utility function given in equation (2) subject to the budget constraint imposed in equation (4) . The Lagrangian function for this maximization problem is given by: 2
The maximization is based on the fact that goods of different quality within the same industry are perfect substitutes, therefore consumers only buy goods with the lowest quality adjusted price.
We further assume that in cases where goods of different qualities have the same quality adjusted price, consumers buy goods with the highest quality. Given this the first order condition is given
Here, λ j , denotes the quality of the product on step j of the quality ladder in industry ω at time t.
The demand for all the goods which are below step j on the quality ladder is zero. Using the fact that σ = 1/(1 − κ), we define δ = λ σ−1 . Therefore, the above equation can be rewritten as:
δ is demand adjusted effective measure of quality improvements. Now, taking the ratio of demands for two industries ω 1 and ω 2 , yields the relative demand:
Further, define q j (ω, t) ≡ δ j(ω,t) which can be interpreted as an alternative measure of the quality of a good on step j of the quality ladder in industry ω, i.e, a measure of quality of the state of the art good. Making this substitution in the above equation we get:
Now, rearranging terms and integrating over ω 1 , we get
Note that the left side of the equation above is the expenditure E(t). Rearranging terms and using the notations above we can write down the demand function for good of quality j in industry
Thus the demand for a good of quality j, in industry ω at time t is given by
This completes the first step of the optimization problem. The second step of optimization is a dynamic problem in which the households decide on the allocation of expenditure E(t) overtime.
We assume the existence of capital markets where the households save by investing either in a portfolio of risky securities or in risk free bonds which bears a risk free interest rate. The equilibrium interest rate r(t) ≡ dR(t) d(t) clears the capital market at each moment in time. Further, the no arbitrage condition in the asset market requires that in equilibrium the return from investing in a portfolio of securities should equal the risk free rate of return.
Substituting the demand function from equation (7) into equation (2) and substituting the resulting expression into equation (1), we get the inter temporal indirect utility function of the households. The dynamic optimization problem of the household then reduces to maximizing this indirect utility function, subject to the budget constraint in equation (3) given the rate of interest r(t). Therefore we have:
This problem yields the following Euler equatioṅ
Equations (7) and (8) describe optimal consumer behavior.
Producer Behavior
For each industry and each quality product constant returns to scale prevails, with one unit labor producing one unit of the output. Labor is the only factor of production. It is assumed to be homogeneous and the economy wide endowment of labor grows at a constant rate n. Further, labor markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive and all workers earn the same equilibrium wage rate. Wage is assumed to be the numeraire and is constant through time. At any given point of time there are two types of industries. First, industries where imitation has occurred. In these industries there are multiple quality leaders. Second, there are industries where imitation has not taken place, and we have only one quality leader. We analyze producer behavior in each type of industry. We assume that once imitation takes place there is Bertrand competition between the incumbent and the imitators, driving down the price of the good to its marginal cost and consequently the firms earn zero economic profit.
Once a higher quality good is innovated in a particular industry the innovator is awarded a property right in the form of a patent and becomes the sole producer of the good in the industry.
Note that the demand for all lower quality products is zero and the demand for the innovators good is given by equation (7). However, the system of patents is not perfect and the good is targeted for imitation. The effective duration of the monopoly is determined by the resources that the leader expends to protect the property right. Thus the industry leaders' problem is two fold. The leader acts as a monopolist and therefore chooses the price (p L ) for his product given the demand. The leader also has to decide on the amount of resources to be devoted toward property right protection.
Let a p δ j be the unit cost of property right protection for a good of quality j in industry ω. Note that we have assumed that the unit cost increases as the product moves up a quality ladder.Thus protection of property rights becomes progressively more expensive. This makes sense because as quality keeps upgrading, several layers are added to the good. In such a scenario protecting the property right over a good can become more costly for a variety of reasons. For instance, more money needs to be spend to keep the blue print of several components of the product a secret.
Alternatively, one might need to apply for several patents for different components of the same product. Apple filed 200 patents for the technology relating to the I phone alone. 4 The parameter a p may be interpreted as a fixed cost such as the hourly rate of a patent attorney.
If we let R be the total intensity of property right protection (for example the total number of hours for which a patent attorney is hired ), then the total cost of property right protection at each time would be Ra p δ j . Given this the instantaneous profit function of the single quality leader is given by
as the average quality level across industries and
as the per capita quantity demanded for a single quality leader's product when the product is of average quality. Then using these we can rewrite the profit function as
From the profit function given above, it is clear that the monopolist will charge a limit price λ.
Thus the profit function can be rewritten as:
Note that the profit flow is an increasing function of the relative quality of the firm's product
Q(t) and the market size Z(t)L(t). Also, while profit falls as a result of property right protection, by undertaking this expenditure the monopoly duration increases which may increase the present discounted value of expected profits given by:
R&D Races
We assume that innovation is uncertain and costly and only takes place in industries with multiple quality leaders, i.e, only goods that have been imitated are targeted for innovation. This will certainly be the case if we consider a situation in which further innovation upon a good can only take place if the blue print of the current highest quality good is available to other potential innovators.
Until the time a successful imitation takes place the blue print remains a secret and no other firms can innovate further. While this blue print is available to the property right holder,it can be shown that for some reasonable parameter restrictions the leader has no incentive to go two steps above in the quality ladder.
We further assume that innovation becomes progressively more difficult over time. The amount of labor required for each unit of innovative R&D in industry ω is given by a I δ j , so as j goes up, the per unit cost of innovation in industry ω goes up. If a firm invests Ia I δ j units of labor, then it is successful in discovering the next highest quality product j(ω, t) + 1 with instantaneous probability Idt. Since labor is the numeraire good, the total cost of innovation is also Ia I δ j . Innovations therefore follow a poisson process with arrival rate I.
Imitation is modeled in the simplest possible way. There is an exogenous imitative intensity C with which all goods are targeted for imitation. In case of a successful imitation Bertrand competition ensues between the incumbent monopolist and the imitator and both of them end up making zero economic profit. This intensity of imitation does not vary across industries or overtime. However, as mentioned earlier the single quality leader expends resources (R) to protect his property right from the imitators. Therefore the effective probability of imitation is a function of both C and R. The effective probability of imitation is given by:
Where ϕ can be interpreted as the effectiveness of the property right system. Note that this probability is increasing in C and decreasing in ϕ and R. If the quality leader expends more resources or the system of property rights become more effective, then the instantaneous probability of imitation goes down.
R&D Optimization
In this section we analyze the firms' choice of the optimal innovative intensity and property right protection. All firms engaged in R&D are assumed to maximize their expected discounted profits in deciding how much to invest in innovative actives and amount spent in property right protection.
In what follows we will use j ω to denote the state of the art quality level in industry ω instead of j(ω, t) and leave the dependence on t implicit. For a single quality leader the relevant HamiltonJacobi-Bellman equation is given by: 5
where, V I , is the market value of the single quality leader and V IC is the market value of the imitating firm. Since there are no profits to be earned as a result of imitation, the market value of the imitating firm must be zero at all times, that is V IC = 0. The right side states that the monopolist makes a profit of π L each time period and with instantaneous probability P loses his market value as a result of the imitation. Thus it is the maximized expected return on the stock of a monopolist.
The left side is the return on an equal sized investment in a risk free bond. In equilibrium both have to be equal.
For a potential innovator in an industry where imitation has already taken place, the HamiltonJacobi-Bellman equation is given by:
where V P is the market value of the potential innovator. The firm in each time period incurs a cost of −Ia I δ jω and with probability I it succeeds in innovating the next higher quality good j ω + 1 and becomes the quality leader in the industry. The firm raises the resources for R&D in the capital market by issuing securities to households. Since innovation is an uncertain process these securities are risky. However, the risk is idiosyncratic and the households can earn a sure rate of return by investing in a diversified portfolio.
Note that the optimization problem of the potential innovator is linear in the innovative intensity I. If a I δ jω > V I (j ω +1)−V P , then given free entry into innovation an infinite amount of resources will be devoted to innovative activity or there will be an infinite demand for loans (supply of securities).
This will cause interest rate to rise to infinity and would drive down the present expected market value of the firm to zero. Therefore, the above inequality cannot be sustained in equilibrium.
Similar argument rules out a I δ jω < V I (j ω + 1) − V P as an equilibrium condition. In this model the interest rate adjusts at each point in time to ensure that at equilibrium we have:
As in standard models of free entry and linear technology, the optimal scale of innovative intensity I is indeterminate. In the steady state however, the innovative intensity is determined by the rate of growth of quality, as will be shown in the next section. Multiplying both sides of the equation with I we see that the total costs of innovation exactly equals the expected benefits from innovation, thus the present market value of the potential innovator is zero, i.e, V P = 0. Therefore we get:
Substituting for V I (j ω ) from equation (14) into equation (16) we get:
Equation (17) determines the intensity of property right protection completely in terms of the parameters of the model. As expected, R is negatively related to a p and ϕ. As the per unit fixed cost of property right protection goes up, the total intensity of property right protection goes down.
ϕ is the effectiveness or efficiency of the property right system, if that increases, firms need not devote as many resources toward property right protection. Additionally, an increase in imitative intensity, C, would prompt firms to devote additional resources toward property right protection and therefore R goes up. An increase in δ implies that the monopoly price that can be charged goes up and the firm can make a higher profit at each instant of time. So everything else remaining same, the firm can generate the same expected discounted profit in a shorter duration, therefore they will reduce the expenditure on property right protection to prolong the monopoly power.
Now substituting equation (10), (14) and (16) into equation (13) we get:
where,
is a measure of the relative difficulty of R&D as in Segerstorm (2007) . This is because we have assumed that R&D becomes progressively more expensive as the goods move up the quality ladder as more labor has to be devoted to it. An increase in Q(t) means that the average quality is increasing and more labor is required to maintain the rate of innovation. An increase in L(t) implies that more labor is available for to R&D. Thus x(t) is a measure of the relative difficulty of R&D. Equation (18) is one of the key relationships of the model, linking the state variable x(t) and z(t).
Quality Dynamics
In this section we will analyze the behavior of the variable Q(t), the average quality of goods across industries over time. Let α be the measure of industries with a single quality leader and β the measure of industries with multiple quality leaders.
Where Q L and Q C are the measure of qualities in α and β industries. The time derivative of Q(t)
can therefore be written asQ
The measure Q L in a α industry jumps from j ω toj ω +1 when innovation takes place in a β industry.
Q L drops when imitation occurs in a α industry and a good of quality j ω leaves the industry. Thus we have:Q
This gives us,Q
Using similar reasoning we can establish the followinġ
Substituting equations 19 and 20 into 18 we geṫ
where, q c = Q C /Q(t). The above equation gives us the evolution of average qualities across all industries through time. Note that the growth rate is proportional to the innovation rate over the measure of qualities in the β industries. This makes sense, because innovation in our model occurs only in the β industries. We know that the level of difficulty of R&D is given by the variable x(t).
Differentiating x(t) over time we get:ẋ
In steady state when x(t) is constant overtime we must have
Thus the steady state level of innovation intensity depends on population growth rate and the difficulty of innovation in the β industries. An increase in q c implies that quality in the β industries goes up relative to the average quality, therefore innovation gets more difficult at each step and innovation intensity must go down, unless there is positive population growth. We now need to determine q c , to solve for the steady state innovative intensity completely in terms of the parameters of the model. We know from equation (21) thaṫ
further, we know thatq
so it follows that in the steady state when,q c = 0, we have
and further,
Substituting equation (24) into (23), we get
Note that a positive rate of innovation requires that, P > n (δ−1) . Innovation in this model only takes place in the β industries. Thus imitation is required to sustain innovative activity. The above condition states that rate of imitation should be greater than the relative ease of innovation. This condition is satisfied we assume that a p /a I is sufficiently high. That is, the fixed cost of protecting property rights are high enough.
Labor Market
In this model labor is used for manufacturing the final good in the α and β industries, for innovative R&D and for property right protection. The sum of labor used for each type of activity should be equal to the labor of the economy at each point of time. We will begin by first solving for the total labor requirement for manufacturing.
The total manufacturing employment is equal to total employment in α industries plus the total employment in β industries. The manufacturing employment in an α industry is given by:
The manufacturing employment in a β industry is given by:
The total manufacturing employment is therefore given by:
This yields the following:
where L m is the total manufacturing employment. Note that the manufacturing employment is an increasing function of q c . This is because we have competitive pricing in the β industries, and therefore demand for the goods is higher in these industries so more labor has to be utilized in production. Innovative R&D only takes place in β industries, therefore the total labor used for this purpose is given by:
or,
Once again, employment for R&D is an increasing function of q c , because as quality in β industry increases, innovation gets more difficult and more labor is required for innovative R&D, to maintain the innovative intensity. Finally, we solve for the total labor required for protection of property rights. Property right protection is only undertaken by the single quality leaders in the α industries
The employment for property right protection is an increasing function of q l . This is because the per unit labor requirement on property rights is increasing in quality of goods. A rise in q l implies that quality of goods in the α industries goes up, therefore total employment for property right protection also goes up.The total labor demand is given by L m + L I + L P which must be equal to the labor supply at each time. Thus we get the following:
Dividing both sides of the equation by L(t), we get
Now in any steady state equlibrium x(t) and I are constant, and we know from equation (17) that R is a constant. The above equation therefore implies that in steady state z(t) is also a constant, its value given by:
A constant z implies that in steady state E(t) is also a constant and therefore the interest rate, r(t), is equal to the discount factor ρ. Now, using this in equation (18) we get the steady state zero profit condition in R&D as:
Equation (32) describes the relationship between the variables z and x to maintain zero profits in R&D. Note that z and x are positively related, because as x goes up the cost of maintaining the innovative intensity goes up. This requires that demand z go up in order to earn a higher revenue to justify the additional resources into R&D. Now the labor condition in equation (30) can be rewritten as
Again note that labor condition implies a negative relationship between z and x. As the level of difficulty, x, of R&D rises more resources are needed to maintain the steady state value of Innovation leaving fewer resources for the production of goods thus z falls.
Equation (32) and (33) 
Comparative Statics

Change in ϕ
We first consider the effect of a change in the parameter ϕ on the intensity of innovation, demand (z) and relative difficulty of R&D (x). It can be easily verified that ∂I/∂ϕ > 0. That is an increase in the efficiency of the property right system, leads to increase in the Innovative intensity. This is because an increase in ϕ, everything else same, leads to a fall in P or the probability of successful imitation. Thus the monopoly of the quality leaders lasts for a longer period, hence the innovative intensity goes up.
We now look at the impact of an increase in ϕ on z and x. An increase in ϕ, reduces P, so for each level of x, the firms can maintain a zero profit with lower demand, therefore z goes down.
Thus the R&D condition from figure 1, shifts rightward. Also an increase in ϕ, increases both the z and the x intercept of the resource condition. Therefore we have the following proposition Proposition 1 An increase in the efficiency of the property rights, leads to an increase in the innovative intensity, an increase in the relative difficulty of R&D and has an ambiguous effect on the demand.
In figure 2 (17) is modified to
Additionally, note that the steady state values of R, P, q c and q l also change. These are given as follows:
Substituting the value of P in equations (23) and (24) we get the new steady state values of q c and q l . Note that R is now a decreasing function of the R&D subsidies. This is because as s I increases, the cost of R&D to the innovative firm goes down. The zero profit condition in R&D implies that the expected present value of profits as a result of successful innovation must also go down in equilibrium. This implies that at the margin, the expected benefit from a unit increase in property right protection expenditure must also have gone down. Therefore, the firms decrease the intensity of property right protection. Further, a reduction in R with a constant C and ϕ implies that P must go up. This is clear from the second equation. An increase in P leads to an increase in q c and a decrease in q l .
It can be seen easily that ∂I/∂s I < 0 . Therefore an increase in R&D subsidy leads to a fall in innovative intensity. The intuition behind this result is quite straightforward. An increase in q c
implies that the quality in the β industries has risen relative to the overall quality. This would mean that innovation gets more difficult in these industries and as innovation only takes place in the β industries, overall intensity of innovation goes down. This result is in direct contrast to the result in Segerstorm (2007) , where it is shown that an increase in R&D subsidy leads to a temporary increase in I, but does not lead to a long run change in it. In his model the R&D subsidy does not affect the probability of successful imitation and therefore does not affect the relative quality in the β industries. However, in our model an increase in s I changes the incentives for expenditure on property right protection and therefore the probability of successful imitation. To analyze the impact of an increase in s on z and x we again look at the shifts in the labor market resource condition and the zero profit condition. This is shown in figure 3 below.
The zero profit condition pivots about the origin to the right. The labor market condition also shifts, the z intercept falls and the x intercept increases. It is clear from the figure that depending on how the two curves shift both z and x may increase or decrease. Although if z increases then x also increases. However, a fall in z may be accompanied by either an increase or decrease in x.
Subsidy to property right protection expenditure
The next change we consider is a subsidy on property right protection expenditure for firms. Let us assume there is a subsidy rate s P on property rights expenditure that is undertaken by industry leaders in the α industries. An increase in s P leads to an increase in R, increase in q l and a decrease in q c . An increase in R leads to a fall in P and this in turn causes I to go up. Thus 
Growth and Welfare
To derive the Growth implications of the model we first compute the instantaneous utility of the household. This is given by:
Since the only products that are consumed in equilibrium are the highest quality goods, demand for all other goods is zero and they do not enter the utility function. Now, substituting the value of d jt (ω) from equation (5) into the above equation we get u(t) = EQ(t)
The instantaneous household utility is increasing in per capita expenditure E, the average quality of products Q(t) and the relative quality of goods in the β industries,i.e q c and decreasing in q l .
Taking natural logs on both sides of the equation and differentiating with respect to time we can derive the expression for the rate of growth of the economy.
In the steady state,Q Q = n. Therefore the steady state rate of growth for the economy is given by:
The steady state rate of growth is constant and is positively related to the rate of population growth. This is because in the long run growth in driven entirely by quality improvements as a result of innovative activity. Innovative activity however depends on population growth as innovation in our model becomes progressively more difficult and positive population growth is required to sustain innovation.
Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed the role of expenditures toward property right protection with a standard quality ladders framework where innovation becomes progressively difficult overtime. Innovator undertakes purposive investment into R&D and innovates a higher quality good and becomes a monopoly producer of the good. As soon as the good is innovated it is also targeted for imitation at an exogenously given rate. By expending resources toward thwarting imitation, the innovator attempts to reduce the effective probability of imitation. While this reduces the instantaneous profit of the innovator, it also increases the expected duration of the monopoly profits. The innovator decides on the optimal contribution toward property right protection by balancing these two effects. We find that the optimal contribution is negatively related to the per unit cost of property right protection and the efficiency of the property rights system. At the same time an increase in the exogenous imitative intensity or per unit cost of innovation decreases the optimal property right expenditure. We also derive the optimal innovative intensity in the steady state and show that it is negatively related to the effective probability of imitation and positively related to population growth. Since, innovation becomes difficult overtime a positive population growth is required to sustain innovations in the long run. Finally, we show that in the steady state the rate of growth of the economy is constant and is proportional to the rate of population growth. 
